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ABSTRACT
The literature on legitimation and legitimation processes suggests 
that endorsement, group support of an actor's use of power, should have im­
portant effects on compliance of less powerful actors. Evidence from ex­
perimental investigations provides no consistent support for that argument.
In this article we contend that investigators have generally failed to recog­
nize actions as obiects of legitimation and neglect entirely sources of 
characterizations of legitimacy. As a result, most investigations contain 
uncontrolled sources of variation which do not permit proper specification
I
of legitimation processes.
We identify three objects of legitimation, persons, positions and ac­
tions, and three "types" of legitimacy based on the source of the charac­
terization- ^־ ro^riety, endorsement and authorization--and argue that each 
is important to a proper analysis of legitimation processes. The labora­
tory investigation which we report minimizes uncontrolled variation from 
these additional independent variables and we demonstrate that endorsement 
of an experimental task structure (a system of positions) delays or prevents 
approximately 50% of change which occurs in task structures which are unen­
dorsed. Finally, we offer some speculation about how endorsement produces 
compliance (stability), and some suggestions for further research.
The literature on power and influence processes suggests that persons 
are more likely to comply with those who have legitimate power than with 
those whose power is not legitimate. It is generally assumed that endorse­
ment . or group support of an actor's use of power (Dornbusch and Scott;
French and Raven), plays a central role in legitimating power relations. 
Consequently, it is assumed that endorsement is positively associated with 
compliance by those who are targets of power. But, empirical investigations 
provide no consistent support for that hypothesis (Lopreato; Michener and Burt, 
a>, Raven and French, a, b). This is an embarrassing result. Because 
the assumption that endorsement has effects on compliance is derived from 
a more general theory of legitimacy (Dornbusch and Scott; French and Raven; 
Michener and Burt, a; Weber), failure to find consistent support for that 
proposition calls the more general theory of legitimacy into question.
In this article we reexamine the links between endorsement, legiti­
macy, and compliance. In our view, inadequate conceptualization of legi­
timacy is to blame for the inconsistent results which arise from experimental 
studies of endorsement. The decision to characterize a concrete act as 
"legitimate" or not is the result of a very complicated set of processes.
It is an outcome which is determined by the effects of evaluations of a 
variety of obiects and of the sources of those evaluations. While in some 
sense it is reasonable to think of actors characterizing concrete acts as 
legitimate or not, a complex analytic framework which takes into account 
the legitimacy of the position of the actor performing the act, the legi­
timacy of the person who occupies that position, and the legitimacy of the
act as specified by the rules associated with that position is implicit 
in their evaluations. In addition, the legitimacy of each of these objects 
of legitimation can be evaluated from the perspective of three different 
kinds of sources¡ One such source of evaluations is a focal actor (whose 
evaluations, following Dornbusch and Scott we will refer to as the pro­
priety of an object); others who are peers of the focal actor are a second 
source (again following Dornbusch and Scott, their evaluations are refer­
red to as endorsement): a third source of evaluations is others who are 
more powerful or influential than the focal actor (referred to as author­
ization) . This complicated set of factors helps to determine an actor's 
characterizations of legitimacy and past research has not always distin­
guished them. Raven and French's (a, b) measure of legitimacy (endorse­
ment) is quite different from that of Michener and Burt (b), and assessing 
the field often reduces to mixing apples with oranges. Another problem is 
that uncontrolled sources of variation frequently obscure the effects of 
endorsement. It is widely recognized that Raven and French (a, b) allowed 
coercive power to conceal the effects of endorsement by peers (Schopler); 
but it is also true that Michener and Burt (b), who separated power from 
legitimacy, did not manage to separate legitimacy of positions from legi­
timacy of persons and acts. We will argue that their failure to do so ob­
scured the effects of endorsement. When uncontrolled sources of variation 
are identified and controlled, as in the experiment reported in the present 
article, we find that under certain conditions endorsement has the effects 
on compliance and stability that theories of legitimacy lead us to expect.
Legitimacy. Endorsement and Compliance: Theory
In its broadest sense, legitimacy refers to the belief that a norm or 
normative system governs or should govern one's actions (Dornbusch and 
Scott; Weber). It is assumed that patterns of behavior will be more stable 
and enduring if they can be characterized as legitimate, that actors who have 
legitimacy attributed to them will be more able to induce compliance than 
those who do not share that attribute, no matter what the personal prefer­
ences of others are and without exercising power, and that actors are more 
likely to engage in behaviors which they believe to be legitimate than those 
which they believe are illegitimate.
While legitimacy is often defined as an individual belief, most the­
orists (Berger and Luckmann; Dornbusch and SCott; French and Raven; Lipset; 
Thibaut and Kelley; Weber) have argued that legitimacy is a product of col­
lective action. It is the collective aspect of legitimacy which is captured, 
in part, by the concept of endorsement or group support. Hence, it has 
been argued that social systems which have the general support or endorse­
ment of their members are more stable (cf. Parsons), that norms or rules 
which are endorsed are less likely to be publicly violated (French and 
Raven; Weber) and that leaders who are endorsed are more likely to secure 
compliance to their demands (Dornbusch and Scott; Etzioni; French and Raven; 
Hollander; Homans).
Endorsement Research
Research findings demonstrate that persons distinguish legitimate from 
nonlegitimate actors and that actors who are perceived as more legitimate
are more highly endorsed. These findings are generally replicated in the 
laboratory (French et al.; Michener and Burt, c; Michener and Tausig;
Mulder et al.; Raven and French, a, b) and in studies conducted in more 
naturalistic settings (Dornbusch and Scott; Olsen; Peabody; Schein and 
Ott; Wood).
Despite the relatively clear association of endorsement with perceived 
legitimacy, differences in endorsement accorded powerful others are not 
consistently related to compliance or acquiescence to their authority 
(Bachman et al.; Fox et al.; Lopreato; Michener and Burt, b; Raven and 
French, a, b).
Raven and French (a) found weak support for the hypothesis that persons 
are more likely to comply with endorsed supervisors than with those who are 
not endorsed. However, their related research (French and Snyder; Raven 
and French, b) and that of others using essentially the same methods (cf. 
Mulder et al.) provides no clear evidence that such a relation exists.
Those investigations generally measured compliance as a change in the rate 
at which subjects performed a task after a supervisor had ordered them to 
increase or decrease the speed at which they worked. Supervisors were 
either elected by a substantial majority of group members (endorsed) or 
usurped the authority of an elected supervisor (unendorsed). Although sub­
jects tended to speed up or slow down as ordered, there were no signifi­
cant differences in the amount of compliance by subjects in the unendorsed 
and endorsed conditions of those experiments.
Supervisors in both experimental conditions had the capacity to fine 
group members. It has been argued (cf. Schopler) that the effects of
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endorsement are confounded with the effects of coercive power in those in­
vestigations. The research designs of the studies do not permit assessment 
of the separate and joint effects of endorsement and coercive power on com­
pliance of group members.
As a response to criticisms of work in the Raven and French tradition, 
Michener and Burt (b) created a factorial design which permitted them to 
assess the independent effects of endorsement and coercive power on com­
pliance. But Michener and Burt offered an additional criticism of earlier 
work. They suggested that there are two types of legitimacy--legitimacy 
of persons or endorsement and legitimacy of positions or normativitv--and 
that distinctions between the two had not been taken into account in pre­
vious research. Normativity, like power, varies independently of endorse­
ment. Therefore, they included both types of legitimacy in their research 
design.
The Michener and Burt study utilized an investment game in which sev­
eral low-status actors’ investments are controlled by a high-status actor. 
The operational measure of normativity was the maximum percentage of the 
low-status actors' resources which the high-status actor could take in 
taxes. Maximum rates of taxation (either 20% or 50%) were agreed upon by 
group members before the experimental trials began. Endorsement was mea­
sured on a scale constructed from responses to five questionnaire items 
about the high-status actor's fitness to continue in the position (cf. 
Michener and Burt, b, c; Michener and Tausig). Endorsement was not varied 
experimentally but it was found to be highly correlated with the success 
or failure of the high-status actor at securing returns on the group mem­
bers' investments, a variable which was subject to experimental control.
The high-status actor always demanded 50% of the subjects' resources 
on crucial trials. This demand was "normative" when the agreed-upon level 
was 50%, but was counter-normative when the level was 20%. Compliance was 
measured as the amount which each subject actually paid. The results in­
dicate that both normativity and coercive power have significant effects 
on compliance. However, the investigators failed to find a significant 
effect of endorsement on compliance.
Michener and Burt's experiment marked an important advance in research 
on legitimacy because it demonstrated a clear effect of legitimacy on com­
pliance when levels of coercive power are controlled. However, we do not 
find their conclusions about endorsement compelling. Although we agree with 
them that legitimacy is a multidimensional concept, we believe that their 
exposition of the underlying dimensions is incomplete. We believe, as they 
do, that there are important effects of the legitimacy of both persons and 
positions, but in addition there are effects due to the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of acts performed by the occupants of positions. Mich- 
ener and Burt neglect this object of legitimation in their conceptualization, 
although it is varied in their experiment. Furthermore, we believe they 
neglect altogether significant effects of differences in who legitimates 
positions, persons or acts¡ the focal actor, the actor's peers, and super­
ordinate others.
Another look at legitimacy
It is certainly correct that there is a distinction between legitimacy 
of persons and of the positions they occupy and that the two may vary sep­
arately. But even when actors legitimately occupy positions which are
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legitimately established, their actions may be either appropriate or in­
appropriate. Hence, to Michener and Burt's person-position distinction 
we add acts. To the extent that they neglect acts as objects of legitima­
tion, Michener and Burt's conception is incomplete.
Another distinction which is found in the literature but is neglected
in much of the empirical work on legitimacy concerns the source of charac-
2
terizations of legitimacy. That is, whose beliefs legitimate a person, 
position or action (Dornbusch and Scott). There are strongly held assump­
tions, and some evidence to support them, that an actor's own beliefs about 
norms, i.e., whether they are internalized or not, have important implica­
tions for individual behavior (cf. Homans; Kelman), and many systems of 
social control appear to rely on internalization of norms as a primary con­
trol mechanism (Etzioni). But internalization of norms is not sufficient 
to generate behavior which is consistent with group norms nor can one im­
mediately infer that those whose׳behavior is counternormative have not 
internalized the norms (Bachman et al.; French and Raven; Merton; Stinch- 
combe; Weber). The beliefs held by other group members appear to have pow­
erful independent effects on an actor's behavior.
Dornbusch and Scott (cf. Scott) suggest that the beliefs of others should 
be differentiated on the basis of their social location and we will follow 
their example. They refer to beliefs held by actors superordinate to a 
focal actor as legitimation by authorization and legitimation by beliefs 
held by peers of the focal actor is called endorsement. Both of these cat­
egories of legitimations are distinguished from an actor's own legitimating
3beliefs or propriety.
If our conceptualization is accurate, studies which examine the effects 
of legitimacy are even more complex than previously imagined. Investiga­
tors must "control" for effects of propriety, endorsement and authorization 
of persons, positions and acts. If the focal actor believes that an act 
is not proper, i.e., it is not appropriate to the position of the actor 
who performs it, there may be an increased tendency toward noncompliance.
But the amount of noncompliance may be reduced if the actor believes that 
the position and the person occupying it are legitimate. Furthermore, the 
illegitimacy of the act may undermine the legitimacy of the person perform­
ing it and still have no effect on the legitimacy (propriety) of the posi­
tion, particularly if the position is authorized and endorsed. In this 
connection Evan and Zelditch found that incompetent behavior undermined 
the legitimacy of actors but not of the positions they occupied. A more 
pertinent example is Michener and Burt's (b) study of ,,normativity." Al­
though they intended to manipulate legitimacy of positions, it is clear that 
what they actually manipulated was legitimacy of an act (whether the tax 
exceeded an agreed-upon amount). Legitimacy of position (extrapolating 
from Evan and Zelditch) should not have varied at all. Furthermore, their 
method made no attempt to separate propriety from endorsement. As a result, 
we assume for subjects in the high-normativity groups that the high-status 
position, its occupant and the act of imposing a 50% tax is initially proper, 
endorsed and authorized (by the experimenter). However, for subjects in the 
low-normativity groups, the imposition of a 50% tax lacks both propriety 
and endorsement. Just how much of the effect of "normativity" on compli­
ance should be attributed to propriety and how much to endorsement of the
4act can not be determined.
This analysis suggests explanations for the failure of the investiga­
tors to find significant effects of propriety of the high-status actor 
(their "endorsement") on compliance. It is possible that there are effects 
of propriety of the actor on compliance which are masked by the action of 
endorsement of the actor (or of some other unmeasured variable). A dif­
ferent kind of research design is required to permit determination of the 
proportion of the normativity effect which is due to propriety of the act, 
or of the existence of an effect of endorsement of the actor. The research 
we report below is an attempt to demonstrate the effects of endtorsement of 
positions on behavior using a research design which minimizes the effects 
of other, possibly confounding factors. We vary endorsement of an experi­
mental task structure (a system of positions) and examine the effects on 
the stability, i.e., attempts to change, of the group structure.
Like Michener and Burt (b), we are arguing that there are no consis­
tent effects of endorsement reported in the experimental literature on legi­
timacy because the effects of endorsement have been obscured by uncontrol­
led sources of variation. In Raven and French's (a, b) and related experi­
ments (French and Snyder; Mulder et al.), power to impose coercive sanc­
tions, which did not vary across conditions, appears to have masked the 
effects of endorsement on compliance. On the other hand, we are arguing 
that Michener and Burt (b) did not vary legitimacy of position, as intended, 
but instead varied legitimacy of acts; and they measured propriety of actors 
not endorsement. The effects of endorsement may well be represented by the 
high correlation between the error terms for propriety and compliance which 
they report.
We believe that virtually any theory of legitimation would postulate 
an endorsement effect, and the inconsistency of previous results is a 
serious embarrassment to such theories. We felt it necessary to discover 
if there was such an effect. In other words, our task is first and fore­
most to simply demonstrate that endorsement makes a difference.
The most direct way to accomplish this purpose, in our view, is to 
vary the endorsement of a system of positions and observe the stability of 
the initial state of the system. This idea, which gave rise to the present 
experiment, treats "endorsement" like Raven and French (and Dornbusch and 
Scott), as the support of the legitimacy of an object by the peers of an 
experimental subject. However, the object of legitimation differs from 
both Raven and French (a, b), where persons were the objects, and Michener 
and Burt (b), who legitimated acts. We focus on a system of positions, 
rather than persons or acts, for several reasons. Partly, it is simply 
a matter of underscoring the importance of social structure in a subject 
too often associated with persons and their acts. But we also believe that 
Michener and Burt (a, b) were correct to focus on the legitimacy of posi­
tions in trying to bring some order to the literature on endorsement; our 
only quarrel is with their operational measure of it. Evan and Zelditch, 
who varied legitimacy of persons by varying the appropriateness of their 
actions, found that the legitimacy of their positions is very stable and 
has a substantial dampening effect on noncompliance. This suggests that 
the right attack is to directly manipulate legitimacy of positions.
We will be concerned with situations which satisfy the following cri­
teria: First, we are only interested in situations in which a group of
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actors is engaged at some valued, collective task. That is, persons must 
act together to accomplish a joint task, the outcomes of which are eval­
uated in terms of their relative desirability. Second, we are interested 
in situations which are formally organized. There must exist rules which 
define what are appropriate relations in the task situation.
Methods
Subjects in this investigation were forty female and thirty-eight male 
undergraduate students who served as paid volunteers. The participants 
were told that they could earn $4.00 - $6.00 in a study of social communi­
cation processes. (All subjects received $5.00 for their participation.) 
Data collected on an additional ten subjects who were suspicious or failed 
to understand procedures have not been included in the analysis.
The setting consists of five soundproofed rooms, each equipped with 
a desk, chair, television monitor, signalling device and a variety of mes­
sage slips. When subjects arrived at the laboratory, they each drew a 
colored token. The color of each token, red, yellow, blue, orange or 
green corresponded to one of the five rooms and was used to identify the 
subject throughout the study. The orange token was never included as the 
"orange" subject was always a confederate.
The subjects were instructed using prerecorded video tapes and were 
told that they were members of a five-person group which would work a series 
of ten problems. The study was presented as an investigation of the effec­
tiveness of various communication systems for groups whose members could not 
engage in face-to-face interaction. It was explained that cooperation and 
accurate transmission of messages were necessary for any members of the
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group to correctly solve the problems they would be given. As a conse­
quence, all earnings were to be awarded to the group. Each member of the 
group was required to submit an answer and the group was to receive $.25 
for each correct answer submitted on each of the ten trials. The group 
earnings were to be divided equally among group members at the end of the 
study. Thus, each member could expect to earn a maximum of $2.50 over ten 
trials.
The task required the construction of a series of five-point, multi- 
line graphs (cf. Faucheux and Mackenzie; Mackenzie). At the start of each 
trial each member of the group had information which corresponded to two 
lines on the solution graph. In order to successfully complete the task 
each member had to collect the information held by the other four members, 
assemble that information and send the solution to the central office. 
Transmission of information and all communication between group members 
was restricted to written messages which were picked up and delivered by 
messengers. A trial was completed when the office had received an answer 
from each of the five members of the group.
The Communication Structure
Each group of subjects was assigned to a Bavelas "wheel" structure 
which consisted of a central position which was occupied by a confederate, 
four peripheral positions and four full channels. Each communication chan­
nel connected one of the peripheral positions to the central position. The 
wheel structure is generally recognized as the most efficient communication 
structure for the type of task to which the group was assigned.
Group members were instructed that the structure had been randomly 
chosen from a group of structures in which the investigators were inter­
ested. The structure was never diagrammed for the participants but was 
described instead in terms of positions (designated by color names) and 
a series of open and closed communication channels. Subjects were reminded 
that they had been randomly assigned to positions in the structure on the 
basis of their initial selections of tokens.
The group members were instructed that they could use the wheel struc­
ture free of charge but the group was given the right to alter the structure 
by renting additional communication channels at a cost of $.05 per channel, 
to be assessed on each trial during which a rented channel was open. No 
channel could be opened or closed unless a majority of group members ap­
proved the action.
Because renting channels was a group activity, the rental costs were 
to be levied against the group. Each group member had a list of open and 
closed channels and rental fees, and the exact procedure for opening chan­
nels was explained during the initial instruction phase. In addition, all 
instructions were available to each subject in an instruction booklet which 
was placed on their work tables.
Creating Pressure to Change: The Unendorsed Structure
After the opening instructions were given, the subjects worked a prac­
tice problem and were given a short questionnaire to complete. The host 
reappeared on the monitor after the questionnaire was answered and indicated 
that although the team had done well on the practice problem, they had 
worked too slowly. The host announced the addition of a sizeable bonus
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($1.25 per trial) to be awarded to the group member submitting the first 
correct solution. The bonus was to serve as an incentive for each of the 
group members to work more quickly and was to be awarded independently of 
other earnings.
The addition of a bonus created inequality of opportunity and pro­
vided "Orange," the confederate occupying the central position, an economic 
advantage. Orange's central location precluded other members winning the 
bonus unless the rules of the game were violated or altered. Pretest re­
sults indicated that adding the bonus created significant pressure to change 
the structure of the work situation. After the bonus procedure was intro­
duced, task instructions were summarized and subjects began the ten cri­
terion trials. After each trial the group was given a short rest period, 
told how much the team had earned on the trial just completed and who had 
won the bonus.
The unendorsed condition was designed to create pressure for the group 
members to alter the task structure. Because they had been led to believe 
that they all had equal abilities and could expect to earn equal amounts, 
it was expected that there would be pressure to change the communication 
structure in order to reduce their inequality of opportunity and to reduce 
their economic disadvantage. Since subjects could only communicate by 
written message and then only to a confederate, any attempt to change the 
structure could be determined by monitoring messages. Each subject was, 
in effect, playing against a confederate and their participation could be 
terminated at the point at which an attempt to alter the structure was made 
without contaminating the results for any other subject since all subjects
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were isolated. Any attempt to change the basic structure of the situation, 
e.g., asking to open additional channels, asking to change the method of 
distributing the bonus, or asking to have the bonus paid directly to one's 
self, was considered sufficient reason to terminate a subject. After a 
subject's participation was discontinued or after ten trials were completed, 
a post-session questionnaire was administered, the subject was interviewed 
and debriefed, and paid for participating in the study. A!l deceptions were 
revealed and explained and subjects were given an opportunity to ask ques-
I
tions about procedures or general questions about the study during the de­
briefing.
Endorsement Manipulation
Experimental procedures for subjects in the endorsed condition dif­
fered from those in the unendorsed condition in only one respect. The short 
questionnaire administered after the practice trial included the following 
item: "Based on your experience with the practice problem, would you say 
you approve or disapprove of this communication system?" Subjects were 
asked to choose one of five response categories varying from ,,highly dis­
approve" to "highly approve." After the questionnaires were collected, each 
member of the groups in the endorsed treatment received a memo from the of­
fice which indicated group members' responses to each questionnaire item.
The memo was constructed to indicate that every other member of the group 
had responded "highly approve." It was assumed that subjects would inter­
pret this memo to mean that other members of the group endorsed the commu­
nication structure. After these "findings" were distributed, the host re­
appeared, introduced the bonus procedure, summarized all task procedures 
and instructed subjects to begin the criterion trials.
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If endorsement influences beliefs in legitimacy as our arguments sug­
gest, a number of features of the task situation should be legitimated.
They include: (l) the task as a coordinative, cooperative and collective 
enterprise, (2) the division of labor, i.e., the structure of the communi­
cation network with the confederate in control, (3) the reward system, i.e., 
the basis for rewards and method of distributing rewards, (4) the status 
structure which emphasizes the similarity and equality of subjects which 
is reinforced by random assignment of persons to positions, and (5) the 
distribution of resources, which with the exception of location in the net­
work are equally distributed, i.e., all members were given the same amount 
(but different pieces) of information.
§-t_a.bll.i.t.Y.
As noted earlier, each subject works at the task for ten trials or 
until she or he sends a message to another subject proposing to add one or 
more communication channels to the group structure. Such a message is treated 
as a change-response (or C-response), which in turn is treated as an indi­
cator of the relative stability of the communication network.
This may appear to be an unnecessary and arbitrary shift in both language 
and operations from earlier research on endorsement, in which compliance 
is usually the observed response. In fact, our conception of the experi­
ment would not be harmed by suggesting that a proposal to change the com­
munication network is an act of nonconformity or noncompliance (with the 
status quo or the known preferences of other group members) and that com­
pletion of all ten experimental trials is compliance. However, it is worth 
a brief digression to place the dependent variable more clearly in the
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context of possible responses to illegitimacy. Like legitimacy, at least 
where it is power relations that are legitimate or illegitimate, the response 
process is a complex combination of several analytically distinct components. 
One factor which obviously interests us is compliance. One actor, say Y, 
may or may not comply with demands made by X. A second variable which 
ought to be important is who can make influence attempts. In particular, 
we would want to observe whether it is "acceptable" for only one actor to 
make influence attempts or whether it is acceptable for both X and Y to 
compete for authority. The behavior of some third party, Z, is equally 
important. Z may or may not support either X's influence attempts or Y's 
noncompliance with them, where "support" refers not only to Z's approval 
or disapproval, but the capacity of X or Y to mobilize resources possessed 
by Z. "Stability" of a system of legitimated power is a complex outcome 
of these simpler components. If we assume that X's exercise of power is le­
gitimated by Y and Z--it is both proper and endorsed from Y's perspective-- 
we should find that Y complies with influence attempts of X, does not at­
tempt to influence X, and that Z supports X's influence attempts and Y's 
compliance with them. Given these conditions, the authority structure of 
the {X,Y,Z> system should be stable. If instead neither Y nor Z supports 
X's exercise of power--it lacks propriety and endorsement --then we would 
expect Y to compete with X in making influence attempts, refuse to comply 
with X, and to be supported in both these behaviors by Z, As a consequence, 
the authority structure of the system should be unstable. Of course, a 
variety of cases is possible but how to think about them has never (to our 
knowledge) been worked out. (There is, however, a small body of work on
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"revolutionary coalitions” that deals with the most unstable case. See 
Hoffman et al.; Mess!"et al.; Michener and Lawler; Michener and Lyons; 
Webster and Smith.)
In the present experiment, a rather direct attempt is made to focus 
on a kind of "influence attempt" which can be concretely linked to insta­
bility, i.e., that has change as its specific content. However, in the 
interest of comparability with previous experiments on endorsement, it 
should be underlined that "change" means ,,noncompliance," and absence of 
a change-response is directly interpretable as "compliance."
We assumed that endorsement would increase stability of the communi­
cation structure because subjects who believed that other members of their 
group endorsed it would be less likely to suggest changing the structure 
than subjects who had no such information. In addition, we believed that 
those subjects in the endorsement condition who suggest changing the struc­
ture would have to overcome the inhibiting factor of greater legitimacy and 
would wait later in the sequence of trials to make such suggestions. Hence, 
subjects in the endorsed condition are expected to complete more trials 
than subjects in the unendorsed condition. We present two sets of findings 
below. First, we provide the results of tests which indicate the relative 
success or failure of our procedures. Second, we provide the results of 
tests of hypotheses about the relation of variations in endorsement to sub­
jects' attempts to change the task structure.
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RESULTS
Success of Procedures
Our principal hypothesis suggests that endorsement of a system of 
positions will counter pressure to change the system. We believed that 
we could create a task structure and a method of distributing rewards which 
would meet the approval of subjects in the experiment. Our research design 
introduced a feature-־payment of a substantial bonus-־which was designed 
to create pressure to change the task structure. This pressure was expec-
I
ted to be uniform across experimental conditions. We believed that the 
bonus would be unacceptable to the subjects because it would violate their 
expectations for equality of reward and their beliefs about fairness. An­
swers to items on the short questionnaire administered during the study and 
on the longer, post-session questionnaire provide indicators of the success 
of the experimental procedures.
Immediately after they completed the practice trial, subjects were 
asked to indicate on a five-point, likert scale the extent to which they 
approved the wheel structure.^ Subjects generally expressed approval of 
the wheel structure (X = 3.83, where 5 equals "highly approved"). There 
were no statistically significant differences in the responses of subjects 
in the two endorsement conditions ( t, 75 df., = .66, p = .511). Similarly, 
subjects expressed approval for awarding equal payments to team members 
( X = 3.74) with no significant differences in responses by endorsement 
condition ( t, 74 df., = .73, p = .466). However, as expected, subjects 
uniformly disapprove the bonus payment ( X = 1.91; t, 76 df., = .79, p = .432). 
These data suggest that we were successful in our attempts to create a set­
ting which would permit us to test our endorsement hypothesis.
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Endorsement and Attempts to Change the Task Structure
A person who is confronted with the conditions we establish in this 
study must make a decision after every trial. Subjects can: (l) continue 
to perforin the task under conditions which they do not approve, or (2) take 
some action which will promote alteration of the task conditions. We ar­
gue that endorsement will inhibit attempts to alter the task structure by 
reducing the proportion of subjects who make such attempts or by causing 
them to delay taking action. Hence, when responses of subjects in the two 
conditions are compared, there should be variation in the number of trials 
completed and/or in the proportion of persons completing all tea trials.
Although they are convenient as summary statistics, neither the com­
parison of mean values nor of proportions of subjects completing a speci­
fied number of trials provides an appropriate test of our hypothesis.
These measures do not take into account differences in the distributions 
of responses. Several distributions may share similar mean values and may 
result in similar proportions of subjects completing ten trials. In ad­
dition, it is inappropriate to treat intervals between trials of this ex­
periment equivalently. A person working at the seventh trial faces dif­
ferent pressures than a person working at the first or second trial. The 
subject working at the seventh trial (in either condition) believes that 
his or her coworkers have not challenged the work structure. After com­
pleting a few trials, the subject may begin to attribute endorsement, i.e., 
support, of the task structure to coworkers. Hence, given the endorsement 
principle, the longer persons work under the task conditions the more re­
luctant they should be to attempt to change the task structure.
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In order to properly test our hypothesis, we have treated the dependent 
variable as a survival variable. Each person enters the study and has an 
active "life" which varies from one to ten trials. That is, each person 
at each trial is participating or has been withdrawn from participation. 
Differences in the survival experiences can be determined by comparing the 
entire survival curves, the graph of the proportion of persons surviving 
plotted against time. Such an analysis has the advantages of comparing the 
complete response curves instead of isolated points on those curves, e.g., 
number surviving ten trials, and of preserving the unique qualities of ex­
periences at various points in time.
We use a variant of the logrank test (Peto and Peto; Peto et al.) to 
evaluate the significance of differences in survival curves. This test 
is based on the idea that the probability that a person survives through 
some time, t, is a function of the degree of risk the person faces in the 
interval from time 1 through t - 1, multiplied by the risk at t. Groups 
of persons which have experienced different degrees of risk will have dif­
ferent survival curves. The logrank statistic can be calculated in a manner
analogous to chi-square and is distributed approximately as chi-square at
6k - 1 degrees of freedom.
Figure 1 about here
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Figure 1 is the graph of the survival curves for subjects in the un­
endorsed and endorsed conditions. The curves suggest that the survival 
experiences of members of the two groups are substantially different and
the test statistic indicates that the observed differences are statisti-
2
cally significant ( X  = 5.2 7, p = .02). Endorsement significantly in­
hibits subjects' attempts to change the task structure.
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Table 1 about here
Table 1 provides a summary of the basic data. The data in column three 
represent the total number of subjects who initiated change over the ten 
trial period. The expected values reported in column four are calculated 
from the marginal frequencies under the assumption that the proportion of 
subjects initiating change in each of the experimental conditions is equal 
to the proportion of subjects initiating change in the entire sample. The 
O/E ratios indicate that for subjects in the endorsed condition there is 
less change observed than expected and conversely more change than expected 
in the unendorsed condition. The ratio of 0/E ratios (Endorsed/Unendorsed) 
is somewhat more revealing. It indicates that under the conditions of this 
investigation, 50.2% of change experienced in the unendorsed condition is 
prevented or delayed by endorsement.
The purpose of our investigation was to test the hypothesis that en­
dorsement increases the stability of a legitimated system of positions. 
Demonstrating that endorsement increases stability is not the same as 
explaining why such an effect occurs and our experiment was not designed 
with this latter question in mind. Nevertheless, we can make some specu­
lative observations about this question on the basis of responses to items 
on the post-session questionnaire.
The relation between endorsement and the stability of the experimental 
task structure could result from any combination of the following factors:
(l) increased endorsement may influence an actor's belief that the struc­
ture is legitimate, i.e., increase propriety, and increased propriety may 
mediate the effects of endorsement by reducing the impetus to change; (2) 
increased endorsement may lead an actor to expect more disapproval of change- 
initiating or noncompliant actions, and as a consequence the number of 
change-responses is reduced because actors find it inexpedient to make them; 
or (3) increased endorsement may simply reduce the expected probability of 
success for any change strategy which relies on collective action, hence 
making any attempt to induce change appear futile.
These arguments reflect one of the strong convictions with which we 
approached this experiment--and one that is in fact upheld in a number of 
other experiments which treat other aspects of legitimation— that the ef­
fects of endorsement do not depend solely on its effects cars propriety.
We expected that endorsement could and would decrease the probability of 
a C-response even if a subject did not change his or her o®n personal sense 
of the impropriety of the wheel and, although it was less relevant to this 
experiment, a subject's own sense of its propriety would mot. protect a system 
of positions if others did not endorse it. We explored tbis aspect of the 
underlying process by asking both male and female subjects their views about 
the wheel after their first practice trial (and before the bonus was intro­
duced) and, in the case of female subjects, again after the experiment was 
completed.
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Our arguments assume that the effects of endorsement on the timing of 
C-responses are mediated through several factors, only one of which is 
measured in our study. Those arguments suggest that a "causal model" in 
which endorsement has both "indirect" (through propriety of the task struc­
ture) and "direct" effects on the timing of C-responses should describe 
the response patterns we observe. The zero-order correlations among vari­
ables for female subjects are presented in Table 2 while Figure 2 is a path 
model which incorporates those variables.^
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Table 2 about here
The data in Table 2 indicate that both ENDORSEMENT and PR0PRIETY2 are 
significantly correlated with the timing of C-responses (TRIALS). ENDORSE­
MENT is also significantly correlated with PR0PRIETY2 while none of the 
correlations involving PROPRIETY! are significant.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 is a path model which incorporates many of the assumptions 
we make about how endorsement of the task structure affects the timing of 
C-responses. For example, we assume: (l) That PROPRIETYl occurs prior 
to ENDORSEMENT, PR0PRIETY2 and the initiation of a C-response, (2) that 
PR0PRIETY2 occurs after ENDORSEMENT but before the subject makes a deci­
sion about whether to make a C-response and (3) that the error terms for 
PROPRIETY 2 and TRIALS are uncorrelated.® The path estimates for this model
suggest that PR0PRIETY2 has significant effects on TRIALS and, as we argued, 
that ENDORSEMENT also has significant effects on PROPRIETY2. Finally, while 
not statistically significant, ENDORSEMENT also has substantial direct effects 
on the timing of C-responses ( p = .10).
Our interpretation of these results is that in this experiment, legi­
timacy of position acts as a support to the structure, one of the primary 
effects of endorsement being to prevent the erosion of an existing belief 
in the propriety of the task structure which, under other conditions, is 
substantially undermined by adding the bonus. That is, subjects who be­
lieve the task structure is endorsed are more likely to continue to attri­
bute propriety to it (after the bonus is added) than subjects in the un­
endorsed treatment. In turn, subjects who attribute propriety to the struc­
ture are less likely to attempt to change it or are likely to make such 
attempts later in the sequence of ten trials. Rowever, this model attri­
butes only about 29% of the total effect of endorsement on the timing of 
C-responses to indirect sources. As we suggested earlier, we believe that 
in this setting, endorsement probably affects a subject’s perception that 
an attempt to initiate change will meet with disapproval or other sanctions 
from his or her peers and/or it will affect the subject's estimate of the 
likelihood that collective action will be successful. The fact that sub­
stantial effects of ENDORSEMENT on TRIALS persist suggests to us that
9
these and other processes may well affect the timing of C-responses.
Discussion
Although endorsement has been assumed to be a central mechanism through
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which legitimate power secures compliance, attempts to demonstrate the ef­
fects of endorsement on compliance have been embarrassingly unsuccessful. 
Schopler argued that the failure of investigators (e.g., French and Snyder; 
Raven and French, a, b) to find significant effects of endorsement on com­
pliance was due to inadequate research designs in which the effects of legi­
timate power were confounded with the effects of coercive power. Michener 
and Burt (a, b) made a significant advance by making the important concep­
tual distinction between legitimacy of persons (endorsement) and of posi­
tions (normativity) and by creating a research design which permitted them 
to partition the effects of each of them as well as the effects of coercive 
power. Although they found that normativity had significant effects on com­
pliance to leaders, Michener and BUrt (b), much like their predecessors, 
failed to find significant effects of endorsement on compliance. However, 
in a related study (Michener and Burt, c), they found that endorsement had 
significant effects on leaders' use of power. With those developments in 
mind, Michener and Burt appeared to move toward opening two lines of investi­
gation with effects of normativity on compliance as the focus of one line 
and investigations of effects of endorsement on leaders' behavior compri­
sing a separate avenue of research.
We have offered an argument which suggests that, under specified con­
ditions, actors take into account the legitimacy of persons, positions and 
actions as well as the source of those legitimationsT i.e., whether they 
are proper, endorsed and/or authorized (cf. Dornbusch and Scott) when 
selecting behaviors. Our arguments lead us to conclude that Michener and 
Burt's (b) normativity result is due, at least in part, to endorsement of
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actions and that they fail to find effects of propriety of persons (our 
interpretation of their measure of endorsement) because any effects which 
occur are confounded with the effects of other factors which are present 
in their research design.
In the investigation we report here, we varied endorsement of a task 
structure and sought to demonstrate that task structures which were endorsed 
would be less susceptible of change than structures which were not endorsed, 
even when there were substantial incentives to change and the possibility 
of change was legitimated. Our results demonstrate that endorsement of a 
task structure prevented or delayed approximately 50% of change which would 
be expected if the structure were not endorsed. Hence, our work demonstrates 
that endorsement makes a difference. But it does not explain why it makes 
a difference. We have made some speculations about how endorsement works 
and have offered a path model which is consistent with some of our specu­
lations. But more definitive answers await further research.
The absence of any explanation for our findings suggests several questions 
which might be addressed in future research. First, one must ask whether 
endorsement has direct effects on propriety as our path model suggests or 
if the correlation exists because PROPRIETY2 simply measures a subject's 
after-the-fact justification for behavior and that PR0PRIETY2 and ENDORSE­
MENT are correlated because they are both correlated with the behavioral 
measure, TRIALS.
Second, if endorsement of task structures does affect actors' beliefs 
in the propriety of those structures a more general question is raised.
How do various sources of legitimation affect one another? Specifically,
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how does authorization of some object of legitimation affect the likelihood 
of its being endorsed or having propriety attributed to it? Do the inter­
relations among sources of legitimation vary with the nature of the objects 
which are legitimated, e.g., whether they are persons, positions or actions? 
In turn, this question suggests another general issue. How are the various 
objects of legitimation related? For example, do persons who illegitimately 
occupy legitimately established positions--as in Raven and French's (a, b) 
work--acquire legitimacy by acting legitimately? How do positions which are 
not legitimately constituted acquire legitimacy? A fourth general question, 
would focus on how the various sources and objects of legitimation are in­
terrelated and what the implications for the behavior of individuals and 
groups are.
There are a number of specific research questions which are generated 
by contemplation of the more general issues. Our framework suggests that 
both multiple objects and multiple sources of legitimation are interrelated 
and any proposal to examine all of these issues would appear to further 
fragment what is already a fragmented area of inquiry. However, we believe 
that such a framework has the potential to weave, what were heretofore, 
independent strands of research into a coherent whole. For example, early 
work which examined the effects of endorsement of persons on compliance 
(Raven and French, a, b) proceeded independently of work which attempted 
to assess the conditions under which a leader's actions were proper or 
endorsed (e.g., Schein and Ott) or the behavioral responses of others to 
those actions. Michener and Burt's (b) research design recognized that
both endorsement of persons and of positions have implications for behavior 
in the same situation. Our work contributes to that development and suggests 
that no research which treats these issues independently will be successful. 
To us a more appropriate strategy is one in which the effects of specific 
factors can be "isolated" through techniques of statistical and/or experi­
mental control. To do otherwise is to condemn the experimental study of 
legitimation and legitimation processes to repeat the embarrassing failures 
which have plagued it in the past.
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Notes
1. We would argue that much of the literature, and especially that devoted 
to compliance, concerns legitimacy of acts. Executives encounter "zones 
of indifference" (Barnard; Schein and Ott) not because they are perceived 
as illegitimate actors but because of the illegitimacy of their actions. 
Discussions of power refer to the legitimate or illegitimate exercise of 
power as well as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of power structures or 
power holders (Dornbusch and Scott; Goldhamer and Shils). In reality, Mich­
ener and Burt's (b) operational measure of normativity concerns the legi­
timacy of an action, i.e., imposition of a tax assessment, and the corres­
ponding conditions in French, Morrison and Levinger's earlier work are 
labelled legitimate and illegitimate fine conditions.
2. Although the sources and objects we distinguish differ from those sug­
gested by Easton, his A Systems Analysis of Political Life provides a 
thorough-going analysis of legitimacy in terms of objects and sources.
Easton identifies three objects of legitimacy, regimes, communities and 
authorities and three sources, ideology, structure and personal attitudes. 
These distinctions are also employed in Children in the Political System 
(Easton and Dennis), and several empirical applications have made use of 
Easton's conceptualization (cf. Fraser, a, b; Gamson; Muller).
3. Here we reluctantly enter what is at best a terminological morass. 
Michener and BUrt have referred to group support of a role incumbent as 
endorsement but their operational measure of endorsement is at tiroes an 
individual belief (Michener and Burt, b) but at other times the beliefs 
of a collectivity (cf. Michener and BUrt, c). We have chosen to reserve
endorsement to refer to beliefs held by peers of a focal actor about any 
object of legitimation, i.e., persons, positions or actions. When we refer 
to an actor's personal beliefs we will use the term propriety, which is 
used by Dornbusch and Scott in a slightly different sense. As do Dornbusch 
and Scott, we use authorization to refer to beliefs held by those superor­
dinate to a focal actor. Although we recognize the potential for confusion 
which results from a sudden shift in meaning of a central concept, we do so 
for two reasons: First, Dornbusch and Scott's terminology is now reason­
ably well established and is generally consistent with the basic literature 
in this area. Second, the solution we have chosen seems preferable to the 
creation of additional, and possibly confusing, neologisms.
4. At this point we should note that our analysis does not diminish the 
importance of Michener and Burt's (b) result in any way. In our conception, 
the investigators varied, albeit indirectly, both propriety and endorsement 
of an act. Their result demonstrates that actors more often comply with 
orders which possess propriety and endorsement than with orders which lack 
propriety and endorsement. Michener and Burt note the high correlation of 
the error terms for compliance and propriety. The presence of some un­
measured variable which is correlated with both propriety and compliance, 
e.g., endorsement of the actor, could account for that correlation.
5. In order to "control" for any differences in response due to persons 
being members of mixed-sex groups, males and females were run in separate 
investigations. Analysis of the data (Walker and Smith-Donals) indicated 
no significant sex differences in behavior and the data have been pooled.
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6. The statistic we report as chi-square is the Lee-Desu statistic which 
is generated by the survival program in SPSS (Hull and Nie). The statistic 
differs from the logrank statistic only in terms of the computing algorithm. 
For a general discussion of analyses of survival data, see Elandt-Johnson 
and Johnson.
7. ENDORSEMENT is a categorical variable which takes the value 0 if the 
subject is in the unendorsed treatment and 1 if the subject is in the en­
dorsed treatment. PROPRIETYl is a measure of propriety taken after the 
practice trial but before the manipulation of endorsement or addition of 
the bonus. PR0PRIETY2 is a measure of propriety taken on the post-session 
questionnaire administered after the subject's participation in the study 
is terminated.
8. While the first assumption appears to be reasonable given our measure­
ment procedures, and the observed correlation of the error terms for 
PR0PRIETY2 and TRIALS does not differ substantially from zero, we cannot 
say that our measure of PR0PRIETY2 is an indicator of a subject's evalua­
tion prior to her or his decision to make a C-response. Our measure is 
taken after C-responses are made or after the subject has completed a full 
series of ten trials. Unfortunately, the specification requires us to 
assume that PR0PRIETY2 precedes TRIALS. Even though the absence of any 
substantial correlation of the error terms suggests that our specification 
of the time-ordering might be plausible, further research is required to 
demonstrate that the causal ordering we assume actually exists.
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9. This result also suggests an explanation for the negative correlation 
of PR0PRIETY1 and TRIALS (see Table 2). Values of PROPRIETYl are uniformly 
high but they are taken before the bonus induces subjects to want to change 
the task structure. Since C-responses reduce the number of trials a subject 
completes, high levels of PROPRIETYl are associated with somewhat lower 
values for TRIALS. In fact, the more (and earlier) C-responses are made 
the larger the coefficient should be. That this is the case is demonstrated 
by comparing the standardized path coefficient in Figure 2 with the zero- 
order value in Table 2. That part of the effect which is "direct" (repre­
sented by the path coefficient) is substantially larger than the zero-order 
correlation for PROPRIETYl and TRIALS. We beli eve that the negative correla­
tion is an artifact of our measurement procedures which does not accurately 
reflect the true relation of propriety to the timing of C-responses. But 
knowing that between-group differences in initial levels of propriety are 
not significant helps us to rule out the argument that observed differences 
in the timing of C-responses simply result from initial differences in per­
ceptions of the propriety of the task structure.
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TABLE 1. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS MAKING CHANGE RESPONSES BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITION
N
NUMBER OF 
C-RESPONSES 
OBSERVED(0)
NUMBER OF 
C-RESPONSES 
EXPECTED(E)
RELATIVE RATE 
OF CHANGE 
(0/E)*
UNENDORSED 38 34 24.35 1.396
ENDORSED 40 22 31.65 .695
ALL 78 56 56.00 1.000
x2 = 5.27, p = .02
*The ratio of the relative rates of change (E/U), 49.8%, indicates that the endorsement manipulation 
delayed or prevented 50.2% of the change taking place in the unendorsed condition.
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TABLE 2. ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES*
VARIABLES TRLALS ENDORSEMENT PROPRIETY1 PROPRIETY2
TRIALS --- .389** -.125 .385**
ENDORSEMENT ---- .079 .343**
PROPRIETY1
PROPRIETY2
.212
*Female subjects only, N = 40 
**Significant at .05
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Figure 1. Survival Curves: Proportion of Subjects Surviving at Trial 
t by Endorsement Condition
42
V
.910
Path Esi ixna1 5־-״ for the Four-variable ModelFigure 2.
